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Abstract 
This paper reports a reweighting exercise for the New Zealand Household Economic 
Survey, which is the basis of the Treasury's microsimulation model, TaxMod. 
Comparisons of benefit expenditures in a variety of demographic groups, along with 
population data, reveal that TaxMod estimates differ substantially from totals based on 
administrative data, when the weights provided by Statistics New Zealand are used. After 
describing the method used to compute new weights, the calibration requirements are 
reported. These relate to the age structure of the population and the number of 
beneficiaries for Unemployment Benefit, Domestic Purposes Benefit, Invalid's and 
Sickness Benefits and Family Support and Tax Credits. The revised weights and 
expenditure estimates are reported and the resulting distribution of income examined. The 
new weights are found to produce much improved expenditure estimates, without 
distorting the resulting income distribution. The effects of reweighting are demonstrated 
using a simple policy simulation. 
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21 Introduction
Tax microsimulation models are based on large-scale cross-sectional survey
data. Each individual or household has a sample weight provided by the
statistical agency responsible for collecting the data. The weights are used
‘grossing up’ from the sample in order to obtain estimates of population
values. This applies not only to aggregates such as income taxation, the
number of recipients of a particular social transfer, or the number of people
in a particular age group, but the weights are also used in the estimation of
measures of population inequality and poverty.
The typical starting point is to use weights that are inversely related to
the probability of selecting the individual in a random sample, with some
adjustment for non-response. It has become common for agencies, using
‘minimal’ adjustments, to produce revised weights to ensure that, for ex-
ample, the estimated population age/gender distributions match population
totals obtained from other sources, in particular census data.1
However, there is no guarantee that weights calibrated on demographic
variables produce appropriate revenue and expenditure totals. This is prob-
lematic when using a simulation model to examine the likely costs of a hy-
pothetical reform to the tax and transfer system. Reweighting may also be
required when using a dataset that is several years old, so that changes in
the structure of the population may be expected to have taken place.
This paper reports a reweighting exercise for the New Zealand House-
hold Economic Survey, which is the basis of the Treasury’s direct tax and
beneﬁt microsimulation model, TaxMod.2 The Household Economic Survey
1A detailed description of calibration and Generalised Regression (GREG) methods
used in Belgium is given in Vanderhoeft (2001), which also describes the SPSS based
program g-CALIB-S. Bell (2000) describes methods used in the Australian Bureau of
Statistics household surveys, involving the SAS software GREGWT. Statistics Sweden
uses the SAS software CLAN, described by Andersson and Nordberg (1998) and also used
by the Finnish Labour Force Survey. All reweighting reported here was carried out using
Fortran programs written by the authors.
2TaxMod reads in one family at a time, calculates market income, adds income from
various government programs (beneﬁts, superannuation, Family Support, Accommodation
Supplement) according to eligibility, and calculates tax liability. It can provide output at
the personal, family and household level. TaxMod assumes that each individual’s labour
supply remains ﬁxed when the tax and beneﬁt system changes
3examines private households from across New Zealand. It collects expendi-
ture data for the entire household and income data for each individual in
the household. Each surveyed household has a sample weight provided by
Statistics New Zealand.
Section 2 describes the basic method used to compute new weights. Sec-
tion 3 compares the expenditure totals produced by TaxMod, using the
Household Economic Survey weights provided by Statistics New Zealand,
with administrative data relating to actual expenditures. The revised weights
and expenditure estimates are reported in section 4. One problem is that pro-
ducing new weights based on selected conditions may distort other variables
of interest. Section 5 examines changes in the distribution of income arising
from reweighting. Brief conclusions are in section 7.
2 The Reweighting Procedure
This section describes the use of extraneous information to specify calibra-
tion conditions for reweighting, such that the new weights are as close as
possible to the initial or ‘design’ weights.3 The method therefore requires a
distance function to be speciﬁed. Subsection 2.1 provides a formal statement
of the optimisation problem, and subsection 2.2 examines a convenient class
of distance functions. An iterative approach for solving the nonlinear ﬁrst-
order conditions, based on Newton’s method, is derived in subsection 2.3.
Several alternative distance functions are described in subsection 2.4.
2.1 The Problem
For each of K individuals in a sample survey, information is available about
J variables; these are placed in the vector:4
xk =[ xk,1,...,xk,J]
0 (1)
For present purposes these vectors contain only the variables of interest for
the calibration exercise, rather than all measured variables. Most of the
3For an extensive discussion and references to the literature, see Creedy (2003).
4Reference is made here to individuals, but a feature of the weights in the Household
Economic Survey is that the household and individual weights are the same.
4elements of xk are likely to be 0/1 variables. For example xk,j =1if the kth
individual is in a particular age group, or receives a particular type of social
transfer, and zero otherwise. The sum
PK
k=1 xk,j therefore gives the number
of individuals in the sample who are in the age group, or who receive the
transfer payment.
Let the sample design weights, provided by the statistical agency respon-
sible for data collection, be denoted sk for k =1 ,...,K. These weights can be
used to produce estimated population totals, b tx|s based on the sample, given





Suppose that other data sources, for example census or social security
administrative data, provide information about ‘true’ population totals, tx.
The problem is to compute new weights, wk, for k =1 ,...,K which are






It is thus necessary to specify a criterion by which to judge the closeness of
the two sets of weights.
In general, denote the distance between wk and sk as G(wk,s k).T h e





















5Some authors, such as Folson and Singh (2000) specify the distance to be minimised
as
PK
k=1 skG(wk,s k), but the present paper follows Deville and Särndal (1992).
5where λj for j =1 ,...,J are the Lagrange multipliers. The following sub-
section examines a special class of distance functions for which an iterative
procedure for minimising L is developed.
2.2 A Class of Distance Functions
Consider distance functions having two features: the ﬁrst derivative with
respect to w can be expressed as a function of w/s, and its inverse can be


















Write the inverse function of g as g−1, so that if g(wk/sk)=u, say, then





If the inverse function, g−1, can be obtained explicitly, equation (8) can be
used to compute the calibrated weights, given a solution for the vector, λ.
The Lagrange multipliers can be obtained by post-multiplying (8) by the












Finally, subtracting b tx|s =
PK
k=1 skxk from both sides of (9) gives:











The term sk {g−1 (x0
kλ) − 1} is a scalar, and the left hand side is a known
vector. In general, (10) is nonlinear in λ a n ds om u s tb es o l v e du s i n ga n
iterative procedure, as described in the following subsection.
62.3 An Iterative Solution Procedure












for i =1 ,...,J. The roots can be obtained using Newton’s method. This
involves the following iterative sequence, where λ











The Hessian matrix [∂fi (λ)/∂λ ] and the vector f (λ) on the right hand side
of (12) are evaluated using λ
[I].























Starting from arbitrary initial values, the matrix equation in (12) is used
repeatedly to adjust the values until convergence is reached, where possible.
As mentioned earlier, the application of the approach requires that it
is limited to distance functions for which the form of the inverse function,
g−1 (u), can be obtained explicitly, given the speciﬁcation for G(w,s). Hence,





kλ). As these expressions avoid the need for the numerical





kλ) for each individual at each
step, the calculation of the new weights can be expected to be relatively
6The approach described here diﬀers somewhat from other routines described in the
literature, for example in Singh and Mohl (1996) and Vanderhoeft (2001). However, it
provides extremely rapid convergence.
7quick, even for large samples.7 However, a solution does not necessarily
exist, depending on the distance function used and the adjustment required
to the vector tx −b tx|s.
2.4 Some Distance Functions











Here, g(wk/sk)=wk/sk − 1, and it can be shown that an explicit solution
exists with:
wk = sk (1 + x
0
kλ) (16)













where the term in brackets on the right hand side of (17) is a J by J square
matrix.8
One reason why the chi-squared distance function produces a solution is
that no constraints are placed on the size of the adjustment to each of the
survey weights. It is therefore also possible for the calibrated weights to be-
come negative. However, Deville and Särndal (1992) suggested the following
simple modiﬁcation to the chi-squared function, although the explicit solu-
tion for the chi-squared case is no longer available and the iterative method
must be used.
7Using numerical methods to solve for each g−1 (u) and dg−1 (u)/du, for u = x0
kλ,f o r
every individual in each iteration, would increase the computational burden substantially.





and (17) as λ
0 =
¡
tx − b tx|s
¢0




k. Given sample observations on the variable yk, an es-
timate of the population total, b ty, can be obtained as
PK
k=1 wkyk. Substituting for wk




tx − b tx|s
¢0
B,
where B = T−1 PK
k=1 skxkyk. This provides the link between reweighting and the Gen-
eralised Regression (GREG) estimator. The production of asymptotic standard errors
is often based on this estimator, in view of the result that other distance functions are
asymptotically equivalent; see Deville and Särndal (1992, p.378).
8Suppose it is required to constrain the proportionate changes to certain
limits, diﬀerent for increases compared with decreases in the weights. Deﬁne
rL and rU such that rL < 1 <r U. The objective is to ensure that, for
increases, the proportionate change, w/s − 1, is less than rU − 1, or that
rU >w / s . For decreases, the aim is to ensure that 1 − w/s (or the negative
of the proportional change) is less than 1 − rL, so that rL <w / s .
For the chi-squared distance function, g−1 (u)=1+u, where u = x0λ and
g−1 (u) solves for w/s.H e n c ei fg−1 (u)=w/s is outside the speciﬁed range,
it is necessary to set it to the relevant limit, either rU or rL, rather than
allow it to take the value generated. Since g−1 (u) − 1=w/s − 1=u, the
limits are exceeded if u<r L − 1 and if u>r U − 1.I ne a c hc a s ew h e r et h e
value of g−1 (u) has to be set to the relevant limit, the corresponding value of
dg−1 (u)/du is zero. This approach ensures that weights are kept within the
range, rLsk <w k <r Usk. Hence, negative values of w are avoided simply by
setting rL to be positive.9
It is not necessary to start from a speciﬁcation of G(w,s), since the
solution procedure requires only an explicit form for the inverse function
g−1 (u), from which its derivative can be obtained. Deville and Särndal
(1992) suggested the use of an inverse function g−1 (u) of the form:10
g
−1 (u)=
rL(rU − 1) + rU (1 − rL)expαu
(rU − 1) + (1 − rL)expαu
(18)
where rL and rU a r ea sd e ﬁned above and:
α =
rU − rL
(1 − rL)(rU − 1)
(19)
Thus g−1 (−∞)=rL and g−1 (∞)=rU, so that the limits of w/s are rL
and rU. This function therefore has the property that adjustments to the
weights are kept within the range, rLsk <w k <r Usk, although, unlike the
chi-squared modiﬁc a t i o n ,n oc h e c k sh a v et ob em a d ed u r i n gc o m p u t a t i o n .
9This is much more convenient than imposing inequality constraints and applying the
more complex Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Also, it is desirable to restrict the extent of pro-
portional changes even where they produce positive weights.
10Singh and Mohl (1996), in reviewing alternative calibration estimators, refer to this
‘inverse logit-type transformation’ as a Generalised Modiﬁed Discrimination Information
method.








ª (1 − rL)αexpαu
(rU − 1) + (1 − rL)expαu
(20)
Since g−1 (u) solves for w/s, (18) can be rearranged, by collecting terms in






























The special nature of this gradient function is illustrated by the line D-S in
Figure 1, which shows the proﬁle of (22) for rU =4 .1 and rU =0 .01. The
restriction of w/s to the range speciﬁed is evident.11 F i g u r e1a l s os h o w st h e
function g(w/s) for two other cases mentioned by Deville and Särndal (1992).




¢−2,a n dc a s eBh a sg−1 (u)=( 1− u)
−1.12 In
all cases, the slope is zero, corresponding to a turning point of the distance
function, when w/s =1 . Given the quadratic U-shaped nature of the chi-
squared distance function, the gradient increases at a constant rate, being
negative in the range w/s < 1. Cases A and B also imply U-shaped distance
functions, but with the gradient increasing more sharply for w/s < 1 and
more slowly than the chi-square function in the range w/s > 1.
3 TaxMod Estimates
T h em o s tr e c e n tH o u s e h o l dE c o n o m i cS u r v e y( H E S )d a t aa r ef o rt h e2 0 0 0 -
01 year. This section compares, for each area of expenditure, the estimates
obtained using the New Zealand Treasury microsimulation model, TaxMod,
with unpublished data on the ‘actual’ expenditures. The latter data are
11The distance function itself is given by integrating (22) with respect to w.g i v i n g





















(rU − rL)s/α, which, since it is a constant, may be dropped without loss.
12Deville and Särndal (1992) discuss the use of a normalisation whereby g−10 (0) is set














Figure 1: Alternative Gradient Functions
obtained from the Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Social
Development. However, they are obtained from samples taken from the basic
beneﬁciary data, in view of the diﬃculty of obtaining complete information
at the level of aggregation required.
One role of a microsimulation model is to examine, along with aggregate
cost estimates, the extent to which particular groups in the population are
likely to gain or lose from a tax reform. For this reason it is important to
ensure that the model provides a good representation of the extent to which
expenditures on diﬀerent types of beneﬁtg ot od i ﬀerent types of family.
Table 1 summarises beneﬁt expenditures for 2000-01, disaggregated into a
variety of household types. The values reported for TaxMod use the weights
provided by Statistics New Zealand.13
The ﬁnal column of Table 1 shows the percentage diﬀerence between ac-
tual values and TaxMod estimates, calculated as 100×(actual-TaxMod)/TaxMod:
hence negative values indicate an overstatement by TaxMod. The table shows
13These are integrated weights, not the original weights. For a discussion of the use
of integrated weighting, as described by Lemaître and Dufour (1987), by Statistics New
Zealand, see StatsNZ (2001).
11Table 1: Beneﬁt Expenditure by Family Types (2000-01)
TaxMod Share Actual Share % Diﬀ
($m) (%) ($m) (%)
Unemployment Beneﬁt
Single no children 648 48.7 814 63.7 25.6
1+ children 58 4.4 80 6.3 37.9
Couple No children 175 13.1 139 10.9 -20.6
1 child 194 14.6 77 6.0 -60.3
2 children 148 11.1 79 6.2 -46.6
3+ children 108 8.1 88 6.9 -18.5
All 1,331 100.0 1277 100.0 -4.1
Domestic Purposes Beneﬁt
Single No children 120 9.8 43 3.4 -64.2
1 child 465 38.0 550 44.1 18.3
2 children 388 31.7 404 32.4 4.1
3+children 250 20.4 250 20.0 0
Others 1 0.1 0 0 0
All 1,224 100.0 1,247 99.9 1.9
Invalids Beneﬁt
Single No children 287 62.5 423 66.5 47.4
Couple No children 81 17.6 115 18.1 42.0
Others 91 19.8 98 15.4 7.7
All 459 99.9 636 100.0 38.6
Sickness Beneﬁt
Single No children 138 51.7 195 61.9 41.3
Couple 1+ children 58 21.7 55 17.5 -5.2
Others 71 26.6 65 20.6 -8.5
All 267 100.0 315 100.0 18.0
Family support, Child and Family Tax Credits
Single 1 child 178 15.5 203 20.1 14.0
2 children 176 15.3 217 21.5 23.3
3+ children 175 15.2 184 18.3 5.1
Couple 1 child 88 7.6 60 6.0 -31.8
2 children 216 18.8 128 12.7 -40.7
3+ children 315 27.5 216 21.4 -31.4
All 1,174 100.0 1,008 100.0 -14.1
12that TaxMod overestimates aggregate expenditure on the Unemployment
Beneﬁt by 4.1 per cent, underestimates expenditure on the Domestic Pur-
poses Beneﬁt by 1.9 per cent, and underestimates aggregate expenditure on
the Invalids’ and Sickness Beneﬁts by 38.6 and 18 per cent respectively. For
all beneﬁt categories, TaxMod tends to underestimate expenditure on sin-
gle income families and, in contrast, overestimates expenditure on partnered
families. In some cases, particularly Domestic Purposes Beneﬁt recipients
without children, this general pattern did not apply, possibly reﬂecting the
small size of the sample for certain demographic groups or the diﬃculty of
modelling certain population characteristics. TaxMod underestimates total
expenditure on (combined) Family Support, Child and Family Tax Credits to
single families and, in contrast, overestimates expenditure on Family Support
and the Child Tax Credit to partnered families.
TaxMod computes beneﬁt expenditures on the assumption that all those
who are eligible actually claim their full entitlement. However, it is known
that beneﬁt take-up rates are often less than 100 per cent. This feature
would produce a consistent upward bias in TaxMod estimates, which is not
evident here.14 The diﬀerences were thus judged suﬃciently large to warrant
reweighting.
4 Re-Weighted Estimates
The previous section has shown that, for some of the household types, the
discrepancy between TaxMod estimates and actual expenditure is substan-
t i a l . T h i ss u g g e s t st h a ti nr e w e i g h t i ng the Household Expenditure Survey,
it is important to use calibration values relating to these particular types.15
The calibration requirements used for reweighting are presented in subsection
4.1. The revised weights are discussed in subsection 4.2.
14It would not be appropriate to adjust the sample weights if it were felt that the main
problem related to imperfect take-up of beneﬁts.
15Nascimento Silva and Skinner (1997) examined variable selection in general, but in
the present context the variables naturally arise.
13Table 2: Calibration: Family Composition
Demographic Required StatsNZ
Group Total Weights Diﬀerence
Couples
1 child 343258 338024.8 5233.19
2 children 537178 614249.3 -77071.3
3 children 279735 338799.7 -59064.7
4 children 98436 123542.5 -25106.5
5+children 55267 37108.16 18158.84
Single Persons
no children 1133969 650061.9 483907.1
1 child 142875 111422.9 31452.14
2 children 140624 92211.7 48412.3
3 children 73284 48016.44 25267.56
4 children 31389 17002.09 14386.91
5+ children 19508 13300.6 6207.4
4.1 Calibration Conditions
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the calibration conditions used in reweighting: the
required population totals are given in the second column of each table, under
the heading ‘required total’. These cover respectively the numbers in each
family type, the number of beneﬁtr e c i p i e n t si ne a c hd e m o g r a p h i cg r o u p ,a n d
the number of individuals in each age group.16 The numbers produced by
TaxMod, using the weights provided by Statistics New Zealand, are shown
in the third column of each table. The diﬀerences between the required and
estimated totals, shown in the ﬁnal column of each table, are substantial.
These reﬂect a larger population size combined with population ageing, an
increase in the number of singles, and particularly singles receiving Domestic
Purposes Beneﬁt, Unemployment Beneﬁt and Invalid’s Beneﬁt.
16To avoid singularities, it was of course necessary to omit one category from each of
the classes. The tables show only those calibration conditions actually used.




Single person 104292 58735.08 45556.92
Sole parent 1child 6400 2272.83 4127.17
Couple no child 11045 19628.15 -8583.15
Couple one child 4327 12348.76 -8021.76
Couple 2+children 9206 19559.56 -10353.6
Domestic Purposes Beneﬁt
No children 10285 6891.47 3393.53
One child 52988 32231.24 20756.76
Two+children 57647 36139.9 21507.1
Invalidity Beneﬁt
Single 61343 20345.14 40997.86
Couple 13186 24866.17 -11680.2
Sickness Beneﬁt
Single 42137 14857.64 27279.36
Couple 9908 6976.7 2931.3
widow’s beneﬁciaries
All 9870 8026.07 1843.93




5-9 145204 170507.1 -25303.1
10-14 150403 134371.8 16031.25
15-19 137214 87803.4 49410.6
20-24 116565 81554.2 35010.8
25-44 516856 467125.7 49730.31
45-59 353453 296279.7 57173.28
60-74 199651 194140.6 5510.42
Females
0-4 127864 132633 -4768.95
5-9 138368 112789.8 25578.16
10-14 142813 122452.3 20360.73
15-19 133253 94174.83 39078.17
20-24 116926 85467.6 31458.4
25-44 568121 543435.4 24685.56
45-59 367692 313687.2 54004.78
60-74 211984 190246.9 21737.08
Males and Females


















Figure 2: Statistics New Zealand and New Weights
4.2 Revised Weights
The variation in the survey weights provided by Statistics New Zealand for
the period 2000/01 is illustrated by the solid line in Figure 2, where the
weights are arranged in ascending order for the Household Economic Survey
sample of 2808 households. The number on the horizontal axis thus refers to
the rank of the household. It can be seen that the majority of these weights
are within a fairly narrow range, although some are substantially higher,
suggesting a considerable degree of under-representation of these household
types in the sample.
The iterative reweighting method described earlier was applied using the
various distance functions described. However, it was found that no solu-
tion exists for the Deville and Särndal (1992) function, whatever limits are
imposed on the proportional changes in weights. The procedure produced
















Figure 3: Revised Weights
set to 6 and 0.06 respectively.17 Figure 2 also shows, as the dashed line,
the new weights, also arranged in ascending order. Compared with the ini-
t i a lw e i g h t s ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ep o p u l a t i o ns i z ei se v i d e n t ,w i t hm o s to ft h e
weights increasing.
Despite the size of the limits imposed on the changes, few of the new
weights actually reach those limits. This can be seen from Figure 3 and
particularly Figure 4, which show the revised weights and the ratio of new
to old weights, with the households ranked in the same order as in the solid
line in Figure 2.
The calibrations are based on numbers of individuals and households
falling into the various categories, rather than total expenditures. It is there-
fore not obvious that aggregate expenditure levels will be signiﬁcantly im-
proved. The implications of using the revised weights for estimated expendi-
17The approach used was to start with broad limits and ‘work inwards’ so long as solu-
tions are available. The iterative method quickly reveals when a solution is not possible.
As mentioned earlier, convergence using the Newton method is extremely rapid.
18Table 5: Re-Weighted Beneﬁt Expenditures by Family Types
TaxMod Share Actual Share % Diﬀ
($m) (%) ($m) (%)
Unemployment Beneﬁt
Single No children 815 63.4 814 63.7 -0.1
1+ children 80 6.2 80 6.3 0.0
Couple No children 138 10.7 139 10.9 0.7
1 child 86 6.7 77 6.0 -10.5
2 children 166 12.9 167 13.1 0.6
All 1,286 100 1,277 100.0 -0.7
Domestic Purposes Beneﬁt
Single No children 44 3.5 43 3.4 -2.3
1 child 550 44.1 550 44.1 0.0
2 children 391 31.3 404 32.4 3.3
3+ children 263 21.1 250 20.0 -4.9
All 1,249 100 1,247 99.9 -0.2
Invalid’s Beneﬁt
Single 463 72.7 463 72.7 0.0
Couple 174 27.3 174 27.3 0.0
All 637 100.0 636 100.0 -0.2
Sickness Beneﬁt
Single 216 68.8 216 68.6 0.0
Couple 98 31.2 99 31.4 1.0
All 314 100.0 315 100.0 0.3
Family Support, Child and Family Tax Credit
Single 1 child 185 16.6 203 20.1 9.7
2 children 181 16.2 217 21.5 19.9
3+ children 183 16.4 184 18.3 0.5
Couple 1 child 69 6.2 60 6.0 -13.0
2 children 197 17.6 128 12.7 -35.0
3+ children 302 27.0 216 21.4 -28.5






























Figure 4: Ratio of Revised to Initial Weights
tures in each demographic group are reported in Table 5. It can be seen that
in most cases the TaxMod estimates are much closer to the ‘actual’ values.
However, some concern remains over Family Support, Child and Family Tax
Credits.
5 Income Distributions
Reference has been made brieﬂy to the important concern regarding the
possible eﬀects of reweighting on important variables which are not part of
the calibration exercise.18 This section examines the income distribution
before and after reweighting.
Figure 5 compares the distributions of annual gross income obtained using
the two sets of weights.19 In view of the calibration conditions, it is not
surprising that the reweighted distribution has more people with beneﬁt-
18This point was stressed by, for example, Klevmarken (1998).
19For present purposes each income has been rounded to the nearest multiple of $2000
and the distribution is truncated at $150,000.
20Figure 5: Frequency Distributions of Income
level incomes than with the original weights. The compensating reduction
in frequencies is spread over quite a wide range of higher incomes. An eﬀect
of the chosen reweighting is to increase the total number of people in the
p o p u l a t i o n :t h i si so fc o u r s en o ts h o w ni nt h eﬁgure.
Figure 6 compares the cumulative income distributions before and after
reweighting. The fact that the reweighted income distribution is weighted
more heavily towards low incomes than in the original data is also revealed
in this ﬁg u r e .I tm a yn o tb eo b v i o u sj u s th o ww i d et h eg a pc a nb eb e t w e e n
the two curves, so Figure 7 shows the vertical diﬀerences at each income
level. The vertical scale measures the percentage of the total population;
that is, the peak of 6.5 per cent does not mean that the reweighted numbers
are 6.5 per cent greater at an annual income of $20,000, but rather that the
reweighted ﬁgures have an additional 6.5 per cent of the total population
earning $20,000 or less, compared with the original ﬁgures. In view of the
calibration conditions used, these changes in the income distribution appear
to be quite reasonable.
21Figure 6: Cummulative Income Distributions
Figure 7: Diﬀerences in Proportions
226A P o l i c y S i m u l a t i o n
Having obtained new weights, it is useful to consider their eﬀects on a policy
simulation. For present purposes it is best to specify a very simple pol-
icy change, the eﬀects of which are transparent. Suppose the New Zealand
income tax rates of 33 and 39 per cent are raised to 35 and 41 per cent re-
spectively. At the same time, family support rates are increased by $10 per
week. Clearly, all income tax payers who are not in receipt of beneﬁts will
lose from this reform. Summary information about the reform, using both
the Statistics New Zealand weights and the revised weights, is given in Table
6.
The ﬁrst block of the table decomposes the winners and losers by family
type. Using the revised weights, the policy produces more winners who
are single parents with two or more children; there are 71 thousand who
gain using the new weights compared with 51 thousand families under the
initial weights. However, there are fewer couples with two or more children
who gain (111 compared with 126 thousand). These diﬀerences are also
revealed when considering the net changes in government expenditure, shown
in the second block of the table for the same household types. Government
expenditure on single parents with two or more children increases by more,
while that on couples with two or more children increases by less, when the
revised weights are compared with the old. In total, with the new weights,
the policy change raises less net revenue (or has a lower reduction in net
costs) compared with the old weights: the net revenue change is $14.6m
compared with $38.2m. This change is clearly consistent with the increase
in the number of beneﬁciaries reﬂected in the revised weights.
The changes are decomposed by beneﬁt type in the last two blocks of
the table. There are many more families who gain from the reform and
are in receipt of the Domestic Purposes Beneﬁt, when the new weights are
used (116 compared with 69 thousand families). This translates into a larger
increase in the cost of the DPB of $109.2m with the new weights compared
with $63.6m under Statistics New Zealand weights. The increase in revenue
arising from the large number of losers in the ‘none of the above’ categories
23Table 6: A Policy Reform Using Alternative Weights
Stats NZ weights Revised weights
Families aﬀected (000s)
Gain NC Loss All Gain NC Loss All
Single no child 0 699 112 810 0 866 132 998
Single 1 child 55 1 6 61 67 0 2 68
Single 2+child 51 0 1 52 71 0 0 71
Couple no child 0 295 175 470 0 282 160 442
Couple 1 child 34 27 57 118 31 23 53 107
Couple 2+child 126 13 120 259 111 13 104 228
Overall 266 1034 471 1771 280 1184 450 1914
Changes in Costs ($M)
Single no child 0 0 -52.7 -52.7 0 0 -64.2 -64.2
Single 1 child 27.7 0 -2.0 25.7 33.6 0 -0.6 33.0
Single 2+child 64.4 0 -0.9 63.6 91.0 0 -0.1 90.9
Couple no child 0 0 -121.1 -121.1 0 0 -112.2 -112.2
Couple 1 child 16.5 0 -34.6 -18.1 15.4 0 -34.3 -18.9
Couple 2+child 167.52 0 -103.2 64.3 150.5 0 -93.7 56.81
Overall 276.2 0 -314.4 -38.2 290.5 0 -305.1 -14.6
Families aﬀected (000s)
Unemployment 20 84 1 105 24 136 1 161
DPB 69 9 0 77 116 3 0 119
Invalids Beneﬁt 7 28 0 35 7 53 0 60
Sickness Beneﬁt 4 15 0 20 8 30 0 38
Widows Beneﬁt 2 709 1 90 1 0
NZ Super 1 309 24 334 1 328 24 353
None of above 162 583 446 1192 122 624 425 1172
Overall 266 1034 471 1771 280 1184 450 1914
Changes in Costs ($M)
Unemployment 22.1 0 -0.1 22 27.9 0 -0.2 27.7
DPB 63.6 0 0 63.6 109.2 0 0 109.2
Invalids Beneﬁt 6.1 0 0 6.1 6.1 0 0 6.1
Sickness Beneﬁt 3.7 0 0 3.7 6.3 0 0 6.3
Widows Beneﬁt 1.2 0 0 1.2 0.6 0 0 0.6
NZ Super 2.3 0 -15.9 -13.6 3.5 0 -15.6 -12.0
None of above 177.1 0 -298.4 -121.3 136.8 0 -289.4 -152.6
Overall 276.2 0 -314.4 -38.2 290.5 0 -305.1 -14.6
24comes from those who are taxpayers only. It is clear that judgements about
the likely eﬀects of the policy are inﬂuenced by the weights used.
7 Conclusions
This paper has reported a reweighting exercise for the New Zealand House-
hold Economic Survey, which is the basis of the Treasury’s microsimulation
model, TaxMod. Comparisons of beneﬁt expenditures in a variety of demo-
graphic groups, along with population data, showed that TaxMod estimates
often diﬀered substantially from estimated totals based on administrative
data, when the weights provided by Statistics New Zealand were used. After
describing the basic method used to compute new weights, the calibration
requirements were reported. These relate to the age structure of the popula-
tion and the number of beneﬁciaries for Unemployment Beneﬁts, Domestic
Purposes Beneﬁt, Invalid’s and Sickness beneﬁts and Family Support and
Tax Credits. The revised weights and expenditure estimates were reported
and the resulting distribution of income was examined. The new weights
were found to produce much improved estimates of total expenditure on the
v a r i o u sc a t e g o r i e sw i t h i nar a n g eo fd e m ographic groups, without distorting
the resulting income distribution.
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